Keeping Secrets That Harm Others: Medical Standards Illuminate Lawyer\u27s Dilemma by Watson, Shelly Stucky
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 4 Article 6
1992
Keeping Secrets That Harm Others: Medical
Standards Illuminate Lawyer's Dilemma
Shelly Stucky Watson
Betterman & Katelman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Shelly Stucky Watson, Keeping Secrets That Harm Others: Medical Standards Illuminate Lawyer's Dilemma, 71 Neb. L. Rev. (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol71/iss4/6
Shelly Stucky Watson*




I. Introduction ............................................... 1124
II. Doctor's Duty to Warn Identifiable Third Persons ........ 1124
A. Tarasoff and the Common Law Duty ................. 1124
B. Statutory Adoption .................................... 1126
III. Lawyers' Commitment to Confidentiality ................. 1128
A. Historical Underpinnings ............................. 1128
B. Current Justifications and Rationales ................. 1129
IV. Challenging Confidentiality Harmful to Innocent Third
Persons .................................................... 1131
A. Application of Tarasoff to Attorneys ................. 1131
1. The Tarasoff Arguments .......................... 1131
2. The Attorney-Client Relationship as a Special
Relationship ....................................... 1131
a. Prediction of Dangerousness ................... 1131
b. Power to Control the Client ................... 1133
c. Duty to Society and Public Policy .............. 1133
B. Hawkins v. Kings County Rehabilitation Services .... 1136
1. The Hawkins Decision ............................ 1137
2. Warnings from Third Parties ...................... 1137
3. An Attorney's Duty to the Intended Victim ....... 1139
C. Troublesome Exceptions to Current Lawyer
Confidentiality ........................................ 1140
1. Crime-Fraud Exception ............................ 1140
2. Lawyer Self-protection ............................ 1140
3. Implications of the Troublesome Exceptions ...... 1141
D. Weighing Interests by Comparing Medicine and
Law ................................................... 1141
1. Patient/Client Interest in Confidentiality ......... 1141
2. Interest of Third Persons .......................... 1142
3. Physician/Lawyer Interest ........................ 1143
* Associate, Betterman & Katelman, Omaha, Nebraska.
1123
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
4. Societal Interest ................................... 1143
V. Conclusion ................................................. 1144
I. INTRODUCTION
In routine cases, physician-patient and attorney-client confidential-
ity is uncontroversial. Confidentiality protects patients and clients,
and is thought to enable the professional systems to work. Neverthe-
less, situations exist in which strict confidentiality may conflict with
society's interests. Both common law and statutory law in medical
literature recognize a duty to warn identifiable third persons when a
patient threatens to harm them. It is the thesis of this Article that a
parallel duty to warn third persons of impending harm should exist in
the attorney-client sphere.
The following discussion focuses on the comparison of the medical
duty to disclose and the lawyer's duty of confidentiality in unusual
cases-those in which independent societal interests arguably out-
weigh the client's interests in secrecy. A comparison of the profes-
sions highlights weaknesses in confidentiality's traditional
justifications and rationales.
The Article first presents an overview of the medical duty of dis-
closure to prevent harm to third persons. Next the traditional lawyer
confidentiality rules are discussed. Then the Article challenges law-
yer confidentiality by analogy, logical extension of the special relation-
ships doctrine, discussing troublesome exceptions to the lawyers'
confidentiality rule and comparing the medical duty to disclose. Fi-
nally the Article concludes that in the case of harm to third persons,
lawyers should be under an affirmative duty to disclose client
confidences.
II. DOCTOR'S DUTY TO WARN IDENTIFIABLE
THIRD PERSONS
A. Tarasoff and the Common Law Duty
In 1967, Prosenjot Poddar entered the University of California at
Berkeley where he met another student, Tatiana Tarasoff.1 Poddar
fell in love with Tatiana, but apparently Tatiana had no similar attrac-
tion. Poddar grew depressed and sought psychiatric counselling as a
voluntary out-patient at the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the
university.
In the course of treatment, Poddar informed one of the treating
psychiatrists, Dr. Moore, that he intended to kill Tatiana when she
returned from a summer in Brazil. Dr. Moore decided to have Poddar
1. This version of facts of Thrasoff is from People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal.
1974), the criminal action against Prosenjot Poddar.
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committed for observation in a mental hospital. Poddar was taken
into custody by campus police but was released after they were satis-
fied he was rational and he promised to stay away from Tatiana. Sub-
sequently, the director of the psychiatry department at the hospital
overrode Dr. Moore's orders and directed that Poddar not be placed in
seventy-two hour evaluation.
Two months later, when Tatiana returned from Brazil, she was
murdered by Poddar.2 At no time did the therapists attempt to warn
Tatiana or her parents of Poddar's threats. Tatiana's parents brought
a wrongful death action against the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia, the campus police, and the hospital psychotherapists who han-
dled Poddar's case.
The California Supreme Court held that Tatiana's parents could
state a cause of action for negligent failure to warn 3 against the psy-
chotherapists but not against the police. The majority recognized the
traditional rule that one does not ordinarily owe a duty to control the
conduct of another or warn those endangered by such conduct. How-
ever, the court noted an exception where the defendant stood in some
special relationship with the aggressor or the foreseeable victim.4 The
opinion stated the psychotherapist-patient relationship between Pod-
dar and the therapists created a special relationship that supported
affirmative duties for the benefit of third parties. Accordingly, the
therapists had a duty to warn Tatiana based upon their special rela-
tionship with Poddar. Although by definition the duty to warn re-
quires a breach of patient confidentiality, the court reasoned that "the
benefits of the confidential communications must be weighed against
the public interest in safety from violent assault."s In sum, the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship subjects the psychotherapist to an af-
firmative duty to warn, and the relationship's confidentiality does not
prevent disclosure.
Despite vigorous objections and scholarly criticism of the major-
ity's standard, the Tarasoff rule was adopted in many other jurisdic-
tions in various forms. 6 As a result, there is confusion about the
2. Poddar was convicted of the second-degree murder of Tatiana Tarasoff; however,
the conviction was reversed on appeal due to error in the jury instructions. Since
five years had passed since the original trial and it seemed unlikely a retrial
would result in a conviction, Poddar was not retried but released on condition he
return to India. Vanessa Merton, Confdentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient-
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 290
(1982).
3. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342, 349 (Cal. 1976).
4. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56 (5th Ed. 1984).
5. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
6. Michael R. Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals'Liability
for the Violent Acts of Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391, 400 n.55 (1989)(listing
jurisdictions and categorizing their versions of the Tarasoff rule).
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requirements of the rule and the extent to which psychotherapists
and other health professionals may be liable. In response to the confu-
sion, nearly one quarter of the states have now adopted statutes codi-
fying the Tarasoff duty.7
B. Statutory Adoption
The statutes8 limit the civil liability of mental health care provid-
ers for failing to predict violence by their patients and for failing to
warn or take precautions to protect other people for impending vio-
lence. Generally, the duty of a professional to warn or take precau-
tions against violence by a patient arises only when a patient has
communicated a threat against a third person to the professional.
Under most statutes, if a professional is forced to disclose confidential
information to discharge this duty, the professional is immune from
liability under other statutes which protect patient confidentiality.9
The statutes are distinguished from one another by four factors:
(1) who is subject to the duty to warn or take precautions; (2) the type
of threats which will activate the duty; (3) the required identifiability
of the victim; and (4) the proper means of discharging the duty.lO The
statutes address these factors through a variety of approaches.
Four significant differences appear among all the statutes and the
Tarasoff line of cases. 11 The statutes attempt to provide a solution to
the legal dilemma between breaching confidentiality and giving a
warning or taking precautions. Typically, the statutes do not have ex-
plicit reasonableness standards regarding when the duty to warn or
take precautions arises and what actions the professional should
choose to fulfill this duty.
First, most of the statutes grant immunity to therapists who breach
confidentiality in order to discharge the duty to warn. This prevents
the dilemma, recognized by Justice Clark, which confronts psycho-
therapists under Tarasoff. By an explicit grant of immunity, the stat-
utes shield therapists from a draconian choice between fulfilling a
statutory duty to preserve confidence or a Tarasoff-like duty to reveal.
These approaches afford the mental health professional some breath-
ing space in which to avoid the disclose-reveal dilemma in close cases.
Second, no professional reasonableness standard determines when
the duty arises under the statutes. Under the Tarasoff line of cases,
the existence of the duty depends upon the operations of a standard of
reasonableness used to judge the professional's determination of the
7. Id at 401.
8. For a comprehensive treatment of the statutes see id at 401-03.
9. Id. at 403.
10. Id.




patients dangerous disposition. Under case law, when a professional
applies the standard of the profession with reasonable care and finds
that the patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, the duty
arises to protect third party potential victims. The statutes, on the
other hand, determine when the duty arises by looking to the actions
of the patient, not the reasonableness of the professional. The patient
must communicate a threat before a professional has any duty to take
precautions to protect a third party. Under the statutory scheme,
therefore, it is no longer an issue whether a professional should have
predicted violence by the patient. Rather, if the patient makes a
threat, the duty arises independently of the operations of a legal stan-
dard of professional reasonableness.12
Third, the language of the statutes does away with the reasonable-
ness test used in Tarasoff to evaluate the professional's choice of the
actions necessary to discharge the duty. The statutes specifically pre-
scribe alternative actions which may discharge the duty, including
warning the victim or the police, or both. It is significant that several
of the statutes give a choice of action to be made within the discretion
of the professional. Unlike Tarasoff, the statutes have no explicit pro-
vision for reviewing whether the professional made a negligent choice
of actions to discharge the duty under the circumstances.
Recall in Tarasoff the defendants originally called the police to
have Poddar detained. The police did not detain him because he ap-
peared rational and promised to stay away from Tatiana. According to
the court, the psychotherapists' actions were nonetheless subject to
review to determine whether they had done all that was reasonably
necessary to protect Tatiana from the threat. On the other hand,
under many of the current statutes, a notification to either the police
or the potential victim would discharge the duty.'3 Under such a stat-
ute, the defendants in Tarasoff might have prevailed. Having notified
the police, they would not have been liable for taking over action to
protect Tatiana as needed under the circumstances. Moreover, under
any of the statutes which require notification of both the police and
the victim, the therapists should have known beforehand that a call to
the victim was also required. Presuming that they had followed such a
clear command, their action might not have been subject to a further
reasonableness test and may have protected them from liability.
Thus, regarding the sufficiency of warnings and precautions, the stat-
12. These rules are undoubtedly more easily applied and more certain. However,
they are a mechanistic means to deal with these types of human problems.
13. It is interesting that notification which would have discharged the psychothera-
pist's duty under these new statutes would not have effectively warned Tatiana




utes limit mental health professionals' liability for the violent acts of
their patients.
Finally, most of the statutes retain something like the reasonably
or readily identifiable victim standard to determine whether the duty
to warn or take precautions arises. Thus, in the majority of states, a
reasonableness rule must still be used to determine when the duty
arises. Even in the face of threats by the patient, the statutory duty
will not arise unless the potential victim is reasonably or readily
identifiable.
III. LAWYERS' COMMITMENT TO CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Historical Underpinnings 14
Today's claim of attorney-client confidentiality may be based on
either the Canons, Code, or Rules of Professional Responsibility or on
the Rules of Evidence. Each of these sources can likely trace its ances-
try to the ancient common-law principle of sanctity between a person
and her counsel.15 Ironically, the purpose of the exception in the early
1500s was not concern for the client's interests but rather the honor of
the attorney.16
By the late 1700s, the attorney's honor was no longer the primary
concern, since the "judicial search for truth could not endure to be
obstructed by a voluntary pledge of secrecy... ."17 The basis for the
privilege became the desire to provide a nonapprehensive forum for
people seeking legal advice. As such, the scope of the privilege was
expanded from covering only communications made during current
litigation to protecting any communications made in any legal consul-
tation, regardless of whether there was litigation or even a
controversy.1 8
The generally accepted argument is that in order for an adversarial
system to work, an attorney must be able to effectively relate the cli-
ent's side of the story to the court. In order to effectively relate the
story, the argument goes, the entire story must be available to the at-
torney. Without a rule of confidentiality, the concern is that clients
would feel compelled to withhold information from the person who
most needs that information.
14. By far the most in-depth analysis of the historical basis for attorney-client
confidentiality can be found in Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego:
Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REv. 1091 (1985).
In contrast to my superficial treatment of the history and the sources of
confidentiality, Subin dissects the background and interplay of the sources of the
privilege.
15. 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
16. Id. at 543.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 545.
1128 [Vol. 71:1123
KEEPING SECRETS
This policy has been furthered by the American Bar Association in
its Model Code. Ethical Consideration 4-1 provides that:
[a] lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling
in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system.... The
observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confi-
dences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of
facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages lay-
men to seek early legal assistance.1 9
The comment accompanying Model Rule 1.2 more specifically states
that attorneys "should defer to the client regarding ... concern for
third persons who might be adversely affected."2 0
B. Current Justifications21 and Rationales
Currently, the primary argument in favor of attorney-client confi-
dentiality is the same non-apprehensive forum argument as was devel-
oped in the 1700s. The justification rests on a three-step syllogism.
First, for the adversary system to operate, citizens must use lawyers to
resolve disputes and the lawyers must be able to represent clients ef-
fectively. Second, attorneys can be effective only if they have all rele-
vant facts at their disposal. Third, clients will not employ lawyers, or
at least will not provide them with adequate information, unless all
aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain secret.22 Thus, the
argument goes, attorney-client confidentiality is the foundation of or-
derly and effective adversarial justice.23
The bar relies on additional rationales for confidentiality. Propo-
nents claim that confidentiality improves the attorney-client relation-
ship. It fosters aspects of lawyer and client "dignity"2 4 by promoting
compliance with the law. And, in theory, confidentiality helps law-
yers discover improprieties that the client may be planning and dis-
suades them from so acting.
Practical considerations may also tend to support maintenance of
strict confidentiality. One concern might be the client's expectation
and reliance on complete confidentiality. Limiting confidentiality
might cause client uncertainty regarding what information could be
19. MODEL CODE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980), see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983).
21. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351 (1989).
Zacharias calls for empirical research regarding the theoretical underpinnings of
strict confidentiality and, in doing so, offers an insightful discussion of the
justifications of confidentiality. His thoughtful commentary provided the basis
for Part IJI of this Article.
22. There is no empirical data to support this position. For data to the contrary see
id. at 379-408.
23. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIucs § 6.1.3 (1986).
24. See id § 6.1.4, at 244. In general, if confidentiality encourages the use of counsel,
it also may promote compliance with the law.
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disclosed without fear of repercussions. This uncertainty may induce
the client to lie or "attorney-shop" for an attorney who maintains such
confidences. Finally, the client might feel that the disclosure of infor-
mation by an attorney whose help was sought by the subject of the
disclosure is simply unfair.
Undoubtedly, each of these reasons has played a role in preserving
rules favoring secrecy. In many ways, strict confidentiality also serves
personal interests of segments of the bar. For example, the rules re-
lieve lawyers from the psychological costs of having to make difficult
ethical decisions. It is far simpler to apply a broad rule of confidential-
ity than face each decision on a factual basis.
On balance, however, it is difficult, for example, for the attorney
who knows the truth to ignore the rights of one who has been falsely
accused of a crime. The falsely accused ought to be able to compel the
testimony of those who know he is innocent-if not the guilty person
himself due to Fifth Amendment protections, then the attorney who
knows his client is guilty.25 The attorney should be permitted to come
forward with information sufficient to acquit the falsely accused.
In addition, confidentiality rules may benefit an attorney finan-
cially. For instance, a tax attorney may learn from working with the
books of a client that the client has collected enormous sums for ship-
ments received and distributed from Costa Rica. The client will say
only that the income is from services rendered. The lawyer knows the
client has a national distribution system. The lawyer certainly sus-
pects drug trafficking, but if ever confronted publicly will claim confi-
dentiality. In this way, the attorney can continue to provide services
for which she is well compensated. This self-serving rationale is not a
legitimate reason for continuing broad confidentiality rules. I address
it because, like each of the other rationales discussed in this section, it
contributes to the reasons legal professionals are reluctant to create
exceptions in confidentiality rules.
To accept the arguments in favor of confidentiality, one must reach
one of two conclusions: first, that clients would use lawyers signifi-
cantly less if more exceptions to confidentiality existed; second, that
clients who employ lawyers would reveal substantially less informa-
tion. Both conclusions are questionable.
It is doubtful that clients fully understand the confidentiality rules
as they now stand-if indeed, the rules are explained to them at all.
Even a lawyer who makes a good faith effort to explain the rules and
25. Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confuences: Punishing the Innocent,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 200-02 (1990) (relating the facts of a chilling Texas case in
which the court denied testimony that would have absolved the defendant from




exceptions to a client will likely leave clients confused, at least as to
the details.
A need for help in a complex area likely drives the desire to con-
sult lawyers, not the security of confidential disclosures. As matters
become complex, laypersons are faced with no choice but to consult an
expert.
This serious need may also be a catalyst in prompting full and accu-
rate disclosure. Admittedly, in personal areas the client likely takes
comfort in knowing unnecessary details will not be disclosed. How-
ever, absent such personal details that disclose intent to harm a third
person, there is no reason for this aspect of confidentiality to change.
If the client does withhold facts, it remains unclear whether the repre-
sentation will be significantly altered. A lawyer who knows only par-
tial facts can provide good quality legal advice on the basis of that
information.
Confidentiality rules undoubtedly effect client disclosure, but in
the abstract it is difficult to determine the extent of any effect. If the
number of clients needing broad confidentiality rules is small, the in-
terest in confidentiality should be outweighed by societal interests in
allowing, or even mandating, disclosures.
IV. CHALLENGING CONFIDENTIALITY HARMFUL TO
INNOCENT THIRD PERSONS
A. Application of Tarasoff to Attorneys
1. The Tarasoff Arguments
The two major arguments supporting the Tarasoff duty are the
special relationship between the psychotherapist and patient and the
protection of society from violent assault. A situation where an attor-
ney fails to disclose his client's threatened violence to a third party
appears analogous to the situation of the psychotherapist in Tarasoff;
however, some important differences remain.
2. The Attorney-Client Relationship as a Special Relationship
a. Prediction of Dangerousness
The attorney-client relationship differs from the psychotherapist-
patient relationship in several respects. The psychotherapist-patient
relationship is based on solving the patient's mental health problems,
including any tendencies or fantasies toward violence. As a result, the
psychotherapist is trained to explore and solve psychological problems
that sometimes lead to violence. She is not only aware of the unique
responsibility, but also has the skill and expertise to handle such
situations.
On the other hand, the attorney-client relationship is based on
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solving the client's legal problems; complex psychological problems of
the client are peripheral and generally not within the scope of the at-
torney's skills or services. Because the attorney lacks the necessary
skills and expertise, the attorney should not be expected to act as a
psychotherapist in exploring psychological problems and determining
treatment. These differences between the attorney-client and psycho-
therapist-patient relationships are inherent in the difference between
the professions.
The Tarasoff standard creating a duty for psychotherapists to warn
third parties forwarded by the majority was sharply criticized in a sep-
arate opinion by Justice Mosk. Justice Mosk argued that the duty to
warn should apply only where the psychotherapist has "in fact" pre-
dicted the patient's potential for violence.26 His proposed limitation
was based on the inherent unreliability of predictions by psychothera-
pists of violence by their patients. Mosk cited People v. Burnick,
where the same court determined that psychotherapists' predictions of
violence are unreliable, and therefore held that a person cannot be
committed as a mentally disordered sex offender unless found to be
such beyond a reasonable doubt.27
In the majority opinion of Tarasoff, Justice Tobriner distinguished
Burnick and rejected arguments that psychotherapists are incapable
of predicting when a patient will carry out threats. Justice Tobriner
observed that in Burnick the issue was whether a patient should be
incarcerated, but in Tarasoff the issue was merely whether the thera-
pist should take any steps to protect a threatened victim. Moreover,
he concluded that inaccuracy in predicting violence should not negate
a duty to warn, because "It]he risk that unnecessary warning may be
given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims that
may be saved." 28
Thus, psychotherapists' inaccuracy in predicting violence does not
preclude a duty to warn. Although attorneys arguably have less capa-
bility to predict violence, it is unlikely that they would convince a
court that they should not owe such a duty on the "inability-to-pre-
dict" rationale. One reason is that in most cases the threat of harm to
the third party is credible and clear. The ability to predict dangerous-
ness loses its significance in clear cases. Nonetheless it is the excep-
tional case where the intent to harm a third party is not clear. In
unclear cases it is unlikely that a duty to warn would arise for either a
psychotherapist or a lawyer.
26. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349 (Cal. 1976).
27. Id at 349 n.18.
28. Id. at 349.
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b. Power to Control the Client
Authorities on the psychotherapist's duty to warn have suggested
that the preferred course for the psychotherapist is not to breach con-
fidentiality, but to have the patient voluntarily or involuntarily com-
mitted.29 This option is available to the attorney, albeit in a slightly
restricted form.
For example, Nebraska laws concerning commitment of a mentally
ill dangerous person3O provide that if a person believes another to be
mentally ill and dangerous, she can inform the county attorney and,
along with the sheriff, ask that commitment proceedings be com-
menced.3 ' The definition of a "mentally ill dangerous person" applies
to mentally ill or substance-abusing persons who present a substantial
risk of serious harm to themselves or others as manifested by evidence
of violent acts, recent suicide attempts or other threats of harm.32 If,
after being so informed, the county attorney concurs that the individ-
ual is dangerous and voluntary hospitalization or less restrictive treat-
ment would not suffice, the county attorney then drafts a petition for
review by the mental health board who is given the power to make
commitment determinations. Physicians and psychologists are pro-
vided an additional tool in the form of a limited privilege to hold a
dangerous individual until a peace officer arrives, if the physician or
psychologist has probable cause to believe such individual is a men-
tally ill dangerous person. Attorneys do not have the advantage of
this limited privilege.
Thus, the attorney-client relationship is one of slightly less control
by the lawyer over the client than the doctor over the patient. This
slight degree of difference in control should not be determinative of
whether a duty is owed. It is foreseeable that the discharge of the duty
should be impacted if a situation arises where the lawyer attempts to
warn the identifiable victim and cannot reach him at that time. In
such circumstances the lawyer may not be successful in warning the
victim. There should be an exception in such instances for good faith
efforts to warn.
c. Duty to Society and Public Policy
One of the more persuasive arguments for creating the Tarasoff
duty is the need to protect society from violent assault. It seems few
distinctions would excuse an attorney from a duty to warn similar to
29. Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard So-
ciety, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 374-75 (1976).
30. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1001 to -1081 (1987)(commonly known as the "Mental
Health Commitment Act").
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1024 (1987).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1987).
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that of psychotherapists. However, attorneys also share similarities
with one class that has escaped such affirmative duties: the police.
The most relevant police case is Tarasoff itself, where the court
held the campus police owed no duty to warn Tatiana. The Tarasoff
court held that the police defendants had no special relationship with
either Tatiana or Poddar that would create a duty to warn Tatiana or
her parents.33 A footnote in the opinion reveals the underlying reason
for excluding the police from a duty to warn: "The assertion of a cause
of action against the police defendants under this theory would raise
difficult problems of causation and of public policy." 34
Various California cases have addressed the public policy issue
when considering whether the police should have a duty in tort to pre-
vent foreseeable and avoidable violence. In Morgan v. County of
Yuba, a woman feared the consequences of the release of a man who
was arrested for threatening her.35 The police made a specific promise
to warn her of his release but failed to do so; the man killed her upon
his release. The court held that a duty to warn was created by her
"dependence" upon their promise.
Nevertheless, expansion of this duty has been consistently re-
jected. The California Supreme Court, in Davidson v. City of West-
minster, distinguished Morgan and refused to find a special
relationship between the police and the plaintiff.36 In Davidson, the
police were conducting a stake-out of a laundromat to apprehend a
man who had previously attacked women in nearby laundromats. The
police saw someone they believed to be the attacker enter and leave
the laundromat several times but the police failed to act, waiting for
the attacker to act criminally. The attacker reentered and stabbed the
plaintiff, who was not warned by the police. The court distinguished
Morgan and other similar cases because in Davidson no special rela-
tionship was created by dependence, and that the conduct of the police
did not increase the risk that the plaintiff would have faced had the
officers not been present.37
Consequently, courts have been reluctant to create affirmative du-
ties for the police absent a specific promise to warn or protect. The
cases base their holdings on the lack of a special relationship. How-
ever, it is not readily apparent how Tarasoff and Davidson can be
33. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349 (Cal. 1976).
34. Id. at 349 n.18.
35. Morgan v. County of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
36. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1982).
37. Id. at 900. The Davidson opinion refers to the Tarasofffootnote which questions
the recognition of a cause of action against police defendants on the basis of cau-
sation problems and public policy. It is my view that the public policy still does
not excuse the police in this case because the very purpose of the police is to
protect the public-not to catch a suspect in such a manner as to preserve the best
legal case against him.
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reconciled since the police spent time with Poddar and were aware of
his threats. It would follow that the evidence the police had would
create a special relationship between the police and Poddar sufficient
for a duty to arise to protect Poddar's identifiable victim, Tatiana. Un-
less self-discharge of the duty to warn is allowed because the threats
are retracted, it seems illogical that the police have no duty to warn
while the psychotherapists do. This dilemma has led one commenta-
tor to suggest that the true distinction is not in whether there was a
special relationship, but in whether the party has a supposed power of
predicting violence. 38
In spite of some surface similarities between police and attorneys,
the persuasive analogy is between psychiatrists and attorneys. Both
the psychiatrist and the attorney have a professional relationship with
a single patient or client. Professionals are considered ethically bound
to the patient or client in what is commonly categorized as a fiduciary
relationship, and the fiduciary role is indicative of the special relation-
ship between the professional and the client. The tort liability for cre-
ating a duty to warn third persons should logically cover the cases
where such a special relationship exists. The special relationship cre-
ates obligations toward the patient or client that are not present in the
typical police-society member relationship.
The relationship of police and society stands in stark contrast to
the relationship of professionals and their patients and clients. Unlike
professionals, policepersons have no special relationship with any sin-
gle member of society. Instead, they have a general duty toward soci-
ety in general. Police protection based on special relationships arise's
only at the moment the police make a specific promise to protect a
specific society member.
The special relationship analysis provides a more satisfactory ex-
planation for reconciling Morgan and Davidson. In Morgan, the police
made a specific promise to warn the plaintiff which resulted in the
creation of a special relationship sufficient to impose liability on the
police for failure to warn. After such a promise was made, by failing
to warn the plaintiff, the police in effect breached their self-created
affirmative obligation toward the plaintiff.
Contrast Davidson, where no specific promise to protect the plain-
tiff was made by police. In Davidson, the police were bound only by
the general law enforcement duty to protect the public. Thus, there
arose no special relationship sufficient to impose the duty to warn a
specific person. The Davidson court couched the special relationship
in terms of reliance by the plaintiff in Morgan. However, it is likely
that the plaintiff in Davidson also relied to some extent on police pro-
38. Merton, supra note 2, at 341.
1135
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tection. It makes more sense to talk in terms of justified reliance-
justified because a special relationship was created.
Tarasoff remains difficult because the police knew of the specific
threats and it seems initially that actual knowledge might trigger an
affirmative duty to warn. Yet, knowledge, absent a promise to protect
a specific individual, should not rise to the special relationship test.
Nothing short of an actual promise to warn a specific person should
create the requisite special relationship in the police context.
It follows that any professional should have an obligation to warn
third parties. Professionals, by definition, are in a special relationship
with their clients. In this sense psychiatrists are indistinguishable
from lawyers.
B. Hawkins v. Kings County Rehabilitation Services
A 1979 State of Washington case, Hawkins v. King County Reha-
bilitation Services, is the only reported case of an attorney being sued
for failing to disclose the dangerous threat of a client.39 Hawkins of-
fers insight on whether an attorney should owe a duty to warn and
whether the duty should be limited as compared to that of psychother-
apists. Although Hawkins differed factually from Tarasoff,40 it offers
some compelling arguments regarding the creation of an affirmative
duty for attorneys to warn of a client's intended violent assault.
Michael Hawkins was arrested and booked on a misdemeanor
charge of possession of marijuana. A court-appointed attorney, Rich-
ard Sanders, had a conference with Hawkins, wherein the client di-
rected that Sanders secure his release on bail. Prior to the bail
hearing, Sanders was warned by Hawkins's psychiatrist and his
mother's attorney that Hawkins was mentally ill and potentially dan-
gerous to himself and others. Hawkins had previously threatened his
mother and sister. Hawkins did not express threats or manifest any
agitated behavior in Sanders' presence.
Sanders subsequently appeared at a bail hearing for Hawkins and
failed to volunteer any information concerning Hawkins's mental ill-
ness or dangerousness. Sanders forewarned the psychiatrist and Mrs.
Hawkins of Hawkins's pending release on bail. About eight days later,
Hawkins attacked his mother with a knife and attempted suicide by
jumping off a bridge, which resulted in the amputation of both his
legs.
Mrs. Hawkins filed an action on behalf of herself and her son, al-
leging that Sanders was negligent under two theories. First, the com-
plaint alleged that Sanders was liable for malpractice for failing to
39. Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1979).
40. Id- at 365.
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disclose the information regarding Hawkins's mental illness and dan-
gerousness to the judge who set bail. Second, Sanders allegedly
breached a common law duty to protect foreseeable victims for his cli-
ent's known dangerousness1
1. The Hawkins Decision
The Hawkins court distinguished Tarasoff on three grounds. First,
in Tarasoff, Tatiana was unaware of Poddar's threats; in Hawkins, the
potential victims were aware of Hawkins's dangerousness. Second, in
Tarasoff, the psychotherapist had personally heard his client disclose
an intention to kill Tatiana. In Hawkins, Sanders heard nothing from
Hawkins and had no reason to believe his client was dangerous other
than the warnings from third parties, Mrs. Hawkins' attorney and the
psychiatrist. Third, Sanders received no information that Hawkins
planned to assault any specific person, only that he was mentally ill
and likely to be dangerous to himself and others. Thus, the court con-
cluded that since Hawkins posed no obvious threat to an unknowing,
identifiable third party, Sanders had no duty to warn potential
victimsA2
The issue of whether an affirmative duty existed was not addressed
because the Hawkins case was distinguished factually from the
Tarasoff holding. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the amicus
curiae brief and accepted in dicta its proposed rule for limiting attor-
ney's potential liability for failure to warn.43 The court stated that the
common law duty to volunteer information about a client to a court
considering pretrial releases must be limited to situations where the
information gained convinces counsel that his client intends to commit
a crime or inflict injury upon unknowing third persons. It stated,
"[Me are persuaded by the position advanced by amicus 'that the obligation to
warn, when confidentiality would be compromised to the client's detriment,
must be permissive at most, unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that
the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious personal injuries on an
unknowing party."
The court was unwilling to extend such a duty to the Hawkins facts.
2. Warnings from Third Parties
The Hawkins court does not conclude that an attorney should
never have a duty to warn on the basis of information obtained from
third parties. However, because Sanders had no first-hand knowledge
of his client's threat to others but received the information from third
parties, it raises the question of what standard of evidence is sufficient
to permit an attorney to disclose in order to protect a potential victim.
41. Id at 363 (citing Tarasoff).
42. I at 366.
43. Id. at 365.
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Addressing whether illegality will defeat the privilege of confiden-
tiality, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Clark 44,
held that a mere charge of illegality will not defeat the privilege. The
Court held that prima facie evidence must show that the client in-
tends to commit a crime. A prima facie showing of a client's intent to
commit a violent assault could be met without a first-hand disclosure
from the client. However, this standard merely permits disclosure,
and it does not suggest that prima facie evidence is sufficient to estab-
lish an attorneys' liability for failure to disclose. Regardless, it is pos-
sible that evidence from third parties as to a client's dangerousness
could not meet stricter standards.
Disallowing permissive disclosure merely because the evidence is
not disclosed by the client is overly restrictive. Such a requirement
would undercut the underlying purpose of imposing the duty to dis-
close-protecting third persons from harm. One can imagine cases
where the evidence is circumstantial and piecemeal, yet the harm is
still great. The gravity of the threatened harm is not diminished by
the sources or types of evidence. If one admits that there is a duty to
warn others, then it must follow that the source and type of the evi-
dence should not alter the duty.
The standard of evidence, however, should be more strict absent a
direct indication from the client to the attorney of the intent to harm.
The problem of predicting dangerousness is escalated absent direct ev-
idence from the client. Predicting dangerousness from information
and evidence obtained through third persons and then imposing a duty
to warn potential victims is not a duty to impose readily.
Both Hawkins and Clark deal exclusively with permitted disclo-
sure to protect third persons. It is probable that mandated disclosure
is appropriate in some cases. The Tarasoff lesson is that client disclo-
sures of direct threats to a readily identifiable victim triggers a
mandatory duty to disclose for psychotherapists. It would be inconsis-
tent to posit that the same threats produce only a permissive duty for
lawyers.
The reluctance on the part of the courts to impose such a duty on
lawyers is understandable. First, judges are former practicing lawyers
and can thus easily understand the consequences of imposing this
duty. Second, creating affirmative duties to aid third parties by warn-
ing potential victims is likely seen as a slippery slope in professional
liability. Further, the distinction between lawyer-client relationships
and other trust producing relationships blur sufficiently for a
mandatory disclosure rule to be viewed as a Pandora's box. The ex-
44. United States v. Clark, 289 U.S. 1 (1933)(holding that evidence of a juror's inten-
tional concealment on voir dire of her disqualification, of her arguments with




pansion of the special relationships doctrine to include duty to warn
scenarios, when viewed from the bench, may be paramount to creating
a specific and affirmative duty to rescue.
At this juncture in the law it seems we must either retreat from
the duty to warn for physicians or impose a consistent duty on law-
yers. Imposing a duty to warn upon lawyers in this narrow set of cases
is appropriate. The doctor-patient and lawyer-client professional rela-
tionships certainly support application of the special relationship doc-
trine. Additionally, it seems only right that lawyers and doctors have
special obligations to society by virtue of their respective professions.
The proper standard of evidence is one that takes into account
whether the patient or client disclosed the intended harm and
whether the obligation is permissive or mandatory. Perhaps the most
appropriate way to handle the evidentiary problem is to allow disclo-
sure when the client has not directly disclosed the intended harm or
threats to the professional, as in Hawkins; and to mandate disclosure
in the direct threat cases like Tarasoff. Such a formulation of the rule
would protect the interests of the potential victim and attempt to bal-
ance the harshness of the obligation on the professional.
How strict the standards in the respective cases should be is some-
thing that remains to be seen. My own lack of personal experience,
having only begun practicing law and dealing with my own clients,
inhibits my assertion of precise standards.
3. An Attorney's Duty to the Intended Victim
In addition to the question of third party warnings, Hawkins raises
the question of whether an attorney should have a duty to determine
whether specific victims are identifiable. The Tarasoff court deter-
mined that for a psychotherapist to have a duty to warn, the
threatened party must be a foreseeable victim of danger. However,
the court refused to limit the duty to circumstances where the thera-
pist actually knows who the victim might be. Instead, the court spoke
in terms of persons "readily identifiable."45 In Tarasoff the psycho-
therapists did not know Tatiana or her name, but it was not disputed
that she was readily identifiable.
How then should the attorney's duty to a potential victim be
framed? In distinguishing Tarasoff, the Hawkins court noted only
that Hawkins was mentally ill and likely to be dangerous to himself
and others. Still, Sanders was aware that Hawkins had previously
threatened his mother and sister. Thus, they were "readily identifi-
able" potential victims. However, in Hawkins there were no specific
threats, merely evidence that the client was dangerous and that he
had previously threatened these family members. Under different cir-
45. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 n.11 (Cal. 1976).
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cumstances, where there are specific threats and identifiable
threatened parties, the rule of Tarasoff should apply.
C. Troublesome Exceptions to Current Lawyer Confidentiality46
1. Crime-Fraud Exception
The law prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client in planning fu-
ture crimes and other illegal acts. The justification is thought to be
two-fold: to prevent wrongdoers from eluding the consequence of
wrongdoing when they know the activity to be illegal, and to prevent
lawyers from aiding wrongdoers.47 Clearly there is a problem in dis-
tinguishing past crimes from future crimes under these justifications.
There is no magic moment when an ongoing crime becomes a past
crime. The past and future blur, and therefore distinctions must be
determined factually.
2. Lawyer Self-protection
Lawyers' needs to reveal client information for self-protection cre-
ate a limited exception to the general confidentiality rule.4s The pro-
fessional codes and rules generally recognize an exception that
permits a lawyer to testify as to information that is otherwise confi-
dential to protect the lawyer against a claim of malpractice, or to col-
lect a fee. The defense against malpractice is more easily justifiable
than fee collection.
In the case of a client suing an attorney for malpractice, the confi-
dential information may be crucial to the evidence in the case. Many
courts set aside the privilege because the client is deemed to have
"waived" it by voluntarily placing the contexts of privileged communi-
cations into issue.49 To permit the lawyer to respond fairly to the cli-
ent's charges, the lawyer is authorized to breach the privilege
defensively.5 0
However, fee-collection is different. It permits the attorney to dis-
close client confidences from an offensive posture. The exception pro-
vides that a lawyer suing a client for an alleged wrongful failure to pay
a fee may use confidential information to establish the claim.
Several justifications for the exception can be attempted. Argua-
46. It should be noted at the outset that both these exceptions to strict confidentiality
are permissive, not mandatory. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule
1.6. (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 4-101(C)(1980).
47. WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 6.4.10 at 279.
48. There are other exceptions including client consent, the cocient rule, and the
crime-fraud exception. See generally Wolfram, supra note 23, § 6.4 at 268. I limit
my discussion here to the self-protection exception.
49. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty To Warn Clients About Limits On
Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441, 464 n.103 (1990).
50. WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 6.7.8 at 307.
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bly, lawyers should be entitled to use privileged information to protect
their economic interests. Moreover, fairness should prevent a client
from employing the privilege to the lawyer's disadvantage. But
whatever might be said in favor of each of the arguments, the overrid-
ing consideration is that the rationale also could be used to suppress
other applications of the attorney-client privilege. The privilege in-
flicts numerous sorts of harm on nonlawyers that has not been consid-
ered detrimental enough to have it set aside.51
3. Implications of the Troublesome Exceptions
The necessity of the established right of the attorney to disclose
confidences in self-defense or to prevent future crimes seems obvious.
However, it is fundamentally inconsistent to bar disclosure when
harm to third persons is threatened. It would seem that if, despite
strict confidentiality, attorneys can disclose future crimes and extri-
cate themselves from harm caused by the client, they should certainly
be at minimum permitted to disclose impending harm52 to identifiable
third persons.
If disclosure cannot be justified by the argument that a lawyer may
avoid harm to a third party through disclosure, it follows that it would
not be justified by a lawyer merely seeking to avoid harm to herself
when her competence is challenged or if she must collect her fee. To
let lawyers disclose client information in particular contexts must re-
main a normative question: Are the beneficial effects of strict confi-
dentiality outweighed by countervailing negative effects or by societal
benefits resulting from particular disclosures? A comparison of com-
peting interests in medical confidentiality cases provides some insight.
D. Weighing Interests by Comparing Medicine and Law
1. Patient/Client Interest in Confidentiality
It is no surprise that people who consult either doctors or lawyers
would prefer the subject of the consultation be kept confidential. The
personal nature of the services provided by each is, in fact, a funda-
mental characteristic of both professions. In the ordinary case the
duty to keep the confidences of clients/patients poses no problem for
the respective professional. The very essence of a professional rela-
tionship dictates such a fiduciary relationship between the parties.
For illustration, consider a hypothetical loosely drawn from a re-
51. Id § 6.7.8 at 308.
52. The scope of permitted disclosure and mandatory disclosure is discussed by many
commentators. See, ag., Subin, supra note 14. I purposely leave this question
unanswered. It is my intuition that a general tort reasonableness standard should
prevail as opposed to classification by gravity or severity of the harm, or by a
felony/misdemeanor line as suggested by Professor Subin.
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cent news clipping.53 A doctor's patient is a deeply disturbed bisexual
AIDS virus carrier who is deliberately trying to infect other people
with the disease. The patient is due the same interests in secrecy as
before: the right to privacy and freedom from stigma of the disease.
Nevertheless, the patient additionally desires that confidentiality prin-
ciples operate to allow him to harm others. In such a case, others can
be harmed through nondisclosure.
Clearly the legitimacy of the patient's interests have changed. The
legitimate interest in privacy of information which is of no concern to
others is obvious. Contrast such legitimate privacy interests with the
case of the AIDS patient who intends to harm others through nondis-
closure. In the AIDS scenario, professing an interest in privacy in or-
der to harm others is insupportable. Yet, were the lawyer the one to
whom the patient disclosed, there is no justification for lawyer disclo-
sure in order to protect against harm to third persons.
2. Interest of Third Persons
Whether the AIDS virus carrier tells his doctor or his lawyer of his
intended plan to "conquer the world"54 makes no difference to the
intended victims. These innocent third persons, like Tatiana Tarasoff,
have no knowledge and no reason to take special precautions.5 5
The third persons' interest is really an interest in being rescued.
Long shunned by tort law, a duty to rescue makes a certain amount of
intuitive and moral sense to many people. Creating such an affirma-
tive duty to rescue by disclosing threats of harm in this instance is not
undertaken lightly. The duty to rescue should apply narrowly in in-
stances where the rescuer stands in a special relationship to the
rescuee. Relationships where the duty would be imposed then would
be limited to familial relationships, fiduciary relationships and to
other relationships that impose the same obligations as fiduciary rela-
tionships. Notably, the special relationship may only run one direc-
tion, as is likely in the case of physicians and lawyers to their patients
and clients. The strength of the argument that an interest in being
rescued is valid is based in the closeness of the relationship. 56 The
closer the relationship, the stronger the argument for the obligation to
rescue. Perhaps this is why an infant's parents can be criminally
charged with abandonment. The trust relationship between the pro-
53. Lise Van Susteren, Doctor's Horror: Death on the Loose, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Feb., 26, 1989, at C1.
54. Id
55. Other than the obvious threat of AIDS to homosexual men. The third person
may well be the AIDS carrier's wife.
56. Also, the relationships seem to stand on different footing. The special relation-
ship to the potential victim is a relationship of protection. The special relation-
ship to the potential attacker is a relationship of control.
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fessional and the patient or client is projected to the third person57 to
protect the third person from harm the patient or client intends to
commit. It is true that the more drastic the means needed to rescue
the victim, the closer the relationship must be to sustain the duty. A
simple telephone call to warn the identifiable victim or the police,
however, is easily justified by the attorney-client relationship. Throw-
ing oneself in front of the intended victim about to be shot by your
client is not warranted. Again, a reasonableness standard should
apply.
3. Physician/Lawyer Interest
Physicians and lawyers have interests both in keeping the informa-
tion confidential and in disclosing it. The physician would like to treat
the patient's underlying mental illness and control the AIDS-related
symptoms. This treatment plan may be in jeopardy if the plan to in-
fect others is disclosed. The patient will lose confidence in the physi-
cian, and perhaps in the whole mental health system.
On the other hand, the physician would want to disclose in order to
protect others from the spread of a deadly disease. After all, a major
goal of physicians is to prevent the spread of disease through immuni-
zation and quarantine.
The lawyer would have similar reasons for keeping the secret: to
maintain open communication58 and trust in the relationship. Argua-
bly the lawyer could dissuade the AIDS virus carrier from acting by
bringing it to his attention that to knowingly spread the disease would
be improper. I stop short of categorizing it as a crime because, unless
spreading disease becomes subject to criminal sanctions, research has
shown no successful homicide prosecutions against an AIDS virus car-
rier, even one who allegedly intentionally infects another.
The lawyer may struggle internally as to whether informing poten-
tial victims is proper. Yet, the law of confidentiality is clear-she is
not allowed, let alone mandated, to disclose the impending harm.
4. Societal Interest
How does all of this square with society's interest? Surely society
has an interest in respecting personal autonomy and liberty to the
greatest extent possible. This liberty is at the center of the rationale
for confidentiality. Yet, there is a competing value-a third party's
liberty is at stake. Society should not differentiate whether the infor-
57. This projection of the trust relationship may well create a conflict of interests for
the professional.
58. When an attorney intentionally withholds information, failure to disclose is mor-
ally problematic because it involves professional trying to build and encourage
trust and then using it to deceive. Pizzimenti, supra note 49, at 477.
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mation is disclosed to a physician or a lawyer. To whom the disclosure
is made is immaterial. Instead, society should strike a balance in favor
of preventing danger to life against the possibility that some individual
freedom will be sacrificed. Or against the possibility that patient/cli-
ent disclosure to physicians/attorneys are chilled.
V. CONCLUSION
Under proper circumstances, attorneys should have a duty in tort
to breach confidentiality and take steps to protect a third party. Ap-
plication of Tarasoff illustrates that lawyers owe a duty to protect
third persons from harm when they stand in a special relationship to
their client and/or the third person. My opinion is that direct threats
of serious physical harm to a third party should mandate a lawyer
warning. Discharge of the duty by warning the police, in cases where
the identifiable victim could be warned, should not be available be-
cause it undercuts the protection function of the warning.
However, threats known to the lawyer through indirect evidence,
or instances where the serious harm is of a non-physical nature should
fall under a permissive disclosure rule. A rebuttable presumption in
favor of disclosure might occur when the reasonable lawyer would
conclude that the indirect evidence of serious physical harm is sub-
stantial and conclusive enough to justify breaching confidentiality. Of
course, the parameters of disclosure rules and the applicable eviden-
tiary standards need to be fleshed out, just as in any developing area of
law. However, the application of Tarasoff to the attorney disclosure
situation, the logical application of the special relationships doctrine,
the exceptions to strict confidentiality that currently exist and the
weighing of interests uniformly suggest that attorneys owe such a
duty.
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